

OPERATION ACTIVE RESOLVE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY D2

1 General Information

This intelligence summary covers the last 24 hours (D2).

2 Intelligence

2.1 Air

2.1.1 SCC WEST status

- SCC WEST was engaged the last 24 hours, and this have been a wake up call for the Syrian military leadership about their vulnerabilities from allied air attack. The continuing downing of CJTF assets relies on a functional C2 network, and the Syrian Air Force leadership is worried about capability to withstand attacks.
- **ASSESSMENT:** It is LIKELY that Syrian Air Force have backup Sector Coordination Centers that are able to take over functionality of the primary center. It is HIGHLY LIKELY not much redundancy and LIKELY only 0-1 backup facility per SCC.

2.2 **Sea**

- NSTR

2.3 Ground

2.3.1 Hezbollah trying to get Silkworm missiles

VID have reports indicating communication between Hezbollah and Iran about the
possible purchase and transfer if Silkworm missiles to Lebanon. Currently (D2) VID
do not possess information about the potential targets for the Silkworm missiles.
 Potential targets are Israeli vessels, or CJTF vessels. It is unknown the degree of

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- active support from Hezbollah to Syria in the current conflict. However, Hezbollah have publicly supported Syria's invasion of the Turkish areas.
- ASSESSMENT: It is LIKELY that Hezbollah and Iran have reached an agreement about purchase of Silkworm missiles
- It is EVEN CHANCE that missiles are already underway from Iran towards Lebanon.

2.3.2 Activation of Syrian Reserves

- The Syrian Army leadership have been discussing the option of activating the Syrian reserves as a buffer to prepare for a potential defense of Syria.
- **ASSESSMENT:** It is LIKELY that the Syrian Army leadership will recommend to the Syrian president that he will mobilize the reserves to give sufficient time to prepare the Syrian Reserve forces. It is assessed as LIKELY that the Syrian President will give the order to conduct this mobilization. It is HIGHLY LIKELY that such a decision is expected within the next 0-48 hours.

2.4 Political

2.4.1 Russian discontent with the conflict in Syria

- Russia have now openly voiced their concern and discontent with the conflict in Syria.
 Russia is worried that CJTF will destabilize the situation in the region, and potentially weaken Russian influence.
- **ASSESSMENT:** Russia will LIKELY increase its support to Syria and either covertly or openly support Syria if the opportunity develops.

2.4.2 Potential responses to allied invasion

- VID have reporting that indicates that the State committee of Defense have been activated and chaired its first meeting on D2. The primary topic in this meeting was potential actions for a potential CJTF invasion of Syrian territory. VID reporting indicates that both mobilization of reserves and deterrence in the form of chemical weapons, either as a demonstration or just a official announcement or threat.
- **ASSESSMENT:** It is LIKELY that the Syrian regime are threated by CJTF actions and are considering actions to protect itself.

3 VID Intelligence gaps

- What is the status and disposition of Syrian SCUD units?
- What is the status and disposition of Syrian Naval units?
- What is the Syrian readiness for conducting attacks with WMD?
- What is the status of Syrian Air Force
 - DCA missions? (Does the Syrian Air Force fly CAPs?)
 - QRA (reaction times?, from what bases? type of aircrafts?)
- What is the status of Syrian Air Force A-G missions?
- Is there presence of Russian forces in either Tartus or Bassel Al-Assad airfield?
- What is the status of Syrian IADS?
 - Positions of EWR
 - Position of SAM sites
 - o Is the entire IADS operational?